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MODELING THE GARDEN: HOW NEW JERSEY
BUILT THE MOST PROGRESSIVE STATE
SUPREME COURT AND WHAT CALIFORNIA
CAN LEARN
Kevin M. Mulcahy*
I. INTRODUCTION
State supreme courts decide over ten thousand cases
each year.' Litigants rarely appeal decisions of state supreme
courts; further, for those that do appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court declines to hear or lacks jurisdiction in the majority of
these cases.2 Thus, for thousands of litigants, state supreme
courts provide final decisions. Nonetheless, state supreme
courts receive little attention from legal scholars, popular cul-
ture, and even law school curriculums.' This comment fo-
cuses on two of these tribunals: the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which stands as arguably the most activist, progres-
sive, and, especially in area of individual rights, important
state supreme court; and the California Supreme Court,
which during the middle part of the twentieth century also
excelled as an activist tribunal. However, since its overhaul
in the retention election of 1986, the high court of the Golden
State has failed to continue its tradition of activism.4 This
comment discusses why the New Jersey court receives praise
as an activist tribunal and why California's reputation has
* Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan.
L See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 1 (1988).
2. See id.
3. See Lawrence Baum, State Supreme Courts: Activism and Accountabil-
ity, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 103 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 1989); Michael
Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 32
(1994).
{ See infra Part II.B.3-4.
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changed from progressive to stagnant. More importantly,
this comment discusses what steps California, and other ju-
risdictions, should take to model the New Jersey court and at-
tain a similar activist reputation.
This comment begins with an overview of the New Jersey
and California supreme courts. In particular, Part II dis-
cusses the decisions and individuals credited with each
court's successes and, in California's case, failures. This
background is meant to highlight, rather than exhaustively
spell out, the activist nature of each state's court of last re-
sort. In light of this background, the key question emerges:
why has the New Jersey Supreme Court replaced California
as the most active and progressive state supreme court?' The
analysis section attempts to answer this question by focusing
on (1) the method of selecting and retaining justices in each
state; (2) the support, or lack thereof, of the individual state's
constitution; and (3) the leadership and attitudes of each
court's members.6 Finally, this comment proposes that mod-
eling after the New Jersey system in these three areas will
help transform the California Supreme Court, and high
courts in other jurisdictions, into progressive, activist tribu-
nals.7
II. BACKGROUND
A. The New Jersey Supreme Court
1. History and Structure
Prior to the New Jersey constitutional convention of
1947, the high court of New Jersey8 was hardly activist or
progressive. In fact, the American Judicature Society de-
clared New Jersey to have, "the nation's worst court system."9
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V. This comment asserts that an activist, progressive
state supreme court is desirable. While many regard judicial activism as a
problem rather than a solution, this comment attempts to identify how to cre-
ate, or, in the case of California, recreate an activist state supreme court. Obvi-
ously, these jurisdictions modeling the Garden State must first determine that a
progressive, active tribunal is beneficial.
8. Prior to the 1947 convention, the high court of New Jersey was known
as the Court of Errors and Appeals. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 188.
9. Glenn R. Winters, New Jersey Goes to the Head of the Class, 31
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One scholar characterized the problems in the New Jersey
courts this way: "If you want to see the common law in all its
picturesque formality, with its fictions and its fads, its delays
and uncertainties, the place to look for them is not London,
not in the Modern Gothic of the Law Courts in Strand, but in
New Jersey." ° Highlighting this judicial ineffectiveness and
formality in New Jersey, the high court had sixteen justices
at the time of the constitutional convention in 1947.1
The 1947 constitutional convention took aim at estab-
lishing a more prominent judicial system, focusing on a
strong state supreme court. 2 Article VI of the revised New
Jersey State Constitution vests judicial power in a "Supreme
Court, Superior Court, and other courts of limited jurisdic-
tion."13 The supreme court consists of a chief justice and six
associate justices. 4 The governor nominates and appoints
these justices, with the advice and consent of the New Jersey
Senate." The justices hold office for an initial term of seven
years and, upon reappointment, continue in office during good
behavior, 6 until they reach the mandatory retirement age of
seventy. Thus, after reappointment, each supreme court
justice enjoys "lifetime" tenure, with impeachment 8 and inca-
pacity9 as the only forms of involuntary removal.
2. Activist Decisions of the Court
While a complete survey of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decisions and policies is beyond the scope of this
comment, the following sections highlight the progressive de-
cisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the areas of
JUDICATURE 131 (1948); see also John B. Wefing, Symposium: The 'New Judi-
cial Federalism" and New Jersey Constitutional Interpretation, 7 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 823 (1997).
10. TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 187 (quoting DENIS W. BROGAN, THE
ENGLISH PEOPLE: IMPRESSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 108 (1943)).
Il See TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 188.
12. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy
Making, in JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS: A DECADE OF
CHANGE IN NEW JERSEY 3, 5-10 (1990).
13. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 1, cl. 1.
14. See id. art. VI, § 2, para. 1, cl. 1.
15. See id. art. VI, § 6, para. 1, cl. 1.
16. See id. art. VI, § 6, para. 3, cl. 1.
17. See id. art. VI, § 6, para. 3, cl. 3.
18. See id. art. VI, § 6, para. 4, cl. 1.
19. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 5, cl. 1.
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criminal procedure, the right to refuse medical treatment,
sexual assault standards, and education reform. 0
a. Criminal Procedure in the New Judicial
Federalism
The past quarter-century has witnessed an upsurge in
state court decisions predicated upon state, as opposed to fed-
eral, constitutional law.2 This movement has been termed
the "new judicial federalism."22 With its origins in a Harvard
Law Review article by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J.
Brennan,' the essence of the new judicial federalism is the
reliance on state constitutional law for deciding issues with
parallel provisions in the federal and state constitutions.24
The most frequently cited rationale for the new judicial feder-
alism is the perception that federal courts, under the leader-
ship of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, are no longer as
committed to protecting individual rights as they were during
20. One of the more recognized New Jersey cases, Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (estab-
lishing the Mount Laurel doctrine, which requires that municipalities' land use
regulations provide realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing),
was left out of this discussion because of its sufficient coverage in law texts and
journals. It should be noted, however, that Mount Laurel provides as good an
example of the New Jersey Supreme Court's activism as any of the cited cases.
There are many academic discussions of the New Jersey Supreme Court's ac-
tivism. See Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Ac-
tivists: New Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS:
POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 83, 98 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G.
Alan Tarr eds., 1982) (ranking New Jersey as the most innovative state su-
preme court in propensity to tort law activism in the postwar years); TARR &
PORTER, supra note 1, at 184-236; John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme
Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
701 (1998). For further case law regarding the activism of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.
1985) (holding that when an employer distributes an employment manual to its
workers, the manually contractually binds the company); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965) (expanding the application of strict liability
to residential housing). Interestingly, the California courts have praised the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Schipper for leading the application of
the doctrine of strict liability to the residential home setting. See Oliver v. Su-
perior Court of San Diego, 259 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1989); Kriegler v. Eich-
ler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969).
21 See Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolu-
tion," 74 JUDICATURE 190 (1991).
22. See id. at 190.
23. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
24. See Esler, supra note 3, at 25.
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the Warren Court era.' Most decisions under the new judi-
cial federalism involve criminal procedure issues. In cases
where the Burger and Rehnquist Courts did not accord suffi-
cient protection to criminal defendants, Brennan called upon
state courts to rely on their own constitutions to protect the
individual rights of those accused of crimes.26
The New Jersey Supreme Court responded to Brennan's
call and, in some cases, construed the New Jersey Constitu-
tion to afford greater rights to those accused of crime than
under the federal Constitution. 7 Most notably, the New Jer-
sey court interpreted New Jersey's own constitution to pro-
vide broader rights in search and seizure cases than the
Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, as inter-
preted by the U.S. Supreme Court.28 In State v. Hunt,9 the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the state constitution
creates a privacy interest in telephone billing records, con-
trary to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Mary-
land." Therefore, the New Jersey court struck down the sei-
zure of such records without a search warrant.3 ' The New
Jersey court also found a privacy right in curbside garbage,"2
whereas the U.S. Supreme Court found none."3 Again, the
New Jersey decision required police to obtain a warrant be-
fore searching an individual's curbside garbage.34 Further, in
State v. Smith,35 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
U.S. Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,3 6 to
the extent that Mimms allowed police to require that passen-
gers exit from a stopped vehicle." Instead, the New Jersey
court requires an officer to articulate facts that warrant
heightened suspicion to justify ordering a passenger out of a
25. See id.; see also Latzer, supra note 21, at 190.
26. See Burrell I. Humphreys, The Impact of the New Federalism on Our
First Civil Right, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 855, 856 (1997).
27. See id. at 856.
28. See Ronald Susswein, The Practical Effect of the WNew Federalism" on
Police Conduct in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 859 (1997).
29. State v. Hunt, 450 A2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
30. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
31. See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 956.
32. See State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1982).
33. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
34. See Hempele, 576 A.2d at 814.
35. State v. Smith, 637 A.2d 158 (N.J. 1994).
36. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
37. See Smith, 637 A.2d at 166.
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lawfully stopped vehicle. 8 These cases provide a few exam-
ples of the New Jersey court taking an approach opposite to
the federal courts on search and seizure issues.39
In addition to search and seizure issues, the New Jersey
Court also provides greater protection against self-
incrimination 4 than certain federal decisions. In State v.
Hartley,41 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that after a
cessation of a custodial interrogation, police must administer
fresh Miranda warnings before interrogation resumes.42 The
U.S. Supreme Court does not require such "refresher" warn-
ings.43 Further, in State v. Reed,4 the New Jersey court found
that when the police know an attorney is present, and the at-
torney communicates a desire to confer with the suspect, the
police must make the attorney's presence known to the sus-
pect before custodial interrogation may proceed or continue.45
The court recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
of Moran v. Burbine46 did not require the police to notify a
suspect in similar circumstances. However, the New Jersey
court relied specifically on the state privilege against self-
incrimination to require notification to the suspect." By re-
lying on state, rather than federal, law, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court protects criminal defendants where the U.S. Su-
preme Court is unwilling to and, at the same time, insulates
38. See id. at 167.
39. See also State v. Saez, 653 A.2d 1130 (N.J. 1995) (invoking the New Jer-
sey Constitution to invalidate warrantless police surveillance of drug activity
through a crack in a basement wall); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947 (N.J. 1994)
(finding, contrary to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), that an arrest for
motor vehicle offenses does not automatically permit a search of a motor vehi-
cle); State v. Alston, 440 A-2d 1311 (N.J. 1981) (granting standing to passengers
of an allegedly illegally stopped vehicle to challenge the legality of the search of
the vehicle, thereby rejecting the federal decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978)); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (holding that under the
New Jersey Constitution, the state has a heavier burden of establishing volun-
tariness of a defendant's consent to a search, thereby rejecting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
40. It is interesting to note that in New Jersey the right against self-
incrimination is founded on a common law and statutory-rather than a consti-
tutional-basis. See State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 636 (N.J. 1993).
41. State v. Hartley, 511 A.2d 80 (N.J. 1986).
42. See id. at 88. See generally Arizona v. Miranda, 484 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
44 Reed, 627 A.2d at 630.
45. See id. at 643.
46. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
47. See Reed, 627 A.2d at 646.
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its decisions from scrutiny by the federal Court.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court is certainly not the
only high state court to rely on its state constitution to estab-
lish greater rights for criminal defendants,48 the decisions of
the New Jersey court are among the most progressive in the
country. In fact, Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of
Michigan Law School has dubbed the New Jersey Supreme
Court the "most innovative [court] in the country. ' Further
recognition of the court's activism in this area comes from two
separate studies of the new judicial federalism, both involving
criminal procedure issues." Each study ranked New Jersey
among the nation's leading courts in reliance on its state con-
stitution as a basis for deciding cases. 1 Couple these studies
with the decisions outlined above, and New Jersey stands out
among the most progressive courts in the area of criminal
procedure.52
b. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Another progressive decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court involved the right to refuse medical treatment. In
1976, fourteen years before the U.S. Supreme Court granted
terminally ill patients the constitutional right to refuse medi-
cal treatment,53 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
such a right.54 The In re Quinlan decision provided relief for
Karen Quinlan, a comatose patient, and her family, while es-
tablishing a constitutional precedent for other courts55 and
48. See Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial
Federalism's First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV., at xiii, xxiii (1996).
49. Bruce S. Rosen, A Bold Court Forges Ahead, NATL L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at
38.
50. See Esler, supra note 3, at 26-27 (studying a set of issues related to the
right against self-incrimination); Latzer, supra note 21, at 192 (studying all
criminal procedure cases based upon state constitutional law decided from the
late 1960s to the end of 1989).
51. See Latzer, supra note 21, at tbl. 2; Esler, supra note 3, at tbl. 2.
52. For further recognition of New Jersey's activism in criminal procedure
areas, see Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism
and the Ohio Supreme Court:Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1984);
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64
KY. L.J. 729 (1976).
53. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
55. The Cruzan decision emphasized the importance of the Quinlan deci-
sion, calling it the seminal case in this area of the law. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
270.
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the public to follow.56
On April 15, 1975, Karen Quinlan ceased breathing,
lapsed into a coma, and was placed on a respirator.57 While
Karen was not brain dead by definition, the experts believed
she could not survive without the respirator.58 The litigation
began when "Karen Quinlan's father sought judicial authority
to withdraw the life-sustaining mechanisms temporarily pre-
serving his daughter's life, and his appointment as guardian
of her person to that end."59 The trial court6 ° granted guardi-
anship of Karen's person to a guardian at litem,' -while Mr.
Quinlan received guardianship over Karen's property."
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey reversed the trial court.' The justices centered their de-
cision on Karen's right to privacy." The court began by rec-
ognizing New Jersey's two legitimate governmental interests:
(1) the preservation of human life, and (2) defense of the right
of a physician to administer medical treatment according to
his or her best judgment." The court then noted that the res-
56. For a complete review of the briefs, arguments, and facts of this case,
see JOSEPH QUINLAN, IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QuINLAN: THE COMPLETE
BRIEFS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND OPINION IN THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
(Univ. Publications of Am. 1976).
57. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653-54. Karen remained, throughout the legal
process, in the intensive care unit receiving 24-hour care by a team of nurses.
She required nourishment by a nasal-gastro tube, lost at least forty pounds, and
had a "fetal-like and grotesque" posture. See id. at 655.
58. See id. at 654-55.
59. Id. at 653. Mr. Quinlan requested the court appoint him guardian of
both the person and property of his daughter. See id. at 651. Karen's doctors,
hospital, the Morris County prosecutor, the state of New Jersey, and her
guardian at litem opposed Mr. Quinlan's request. See id. at 650-53.
60. See In re Quinlan, 348 A-2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
61. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670.
62. See id. The trial court found that although Mr. Quinlan was sincere,
moral, ethical, and religious, the obligation to concur in the medical care and
treatment of his daughter would be a source of anguish for him and would dis-
tort his "decision-making processes." See id. at 671.
63. See id. at 671-72.
64. See id. at 662-64. The court immediately rejected Mr. Quinlan's claims
for guardianship based on the Eighth Amendments prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment and the First Amendment's freedom of religion. As for
the latter, the court held that, in light of the State's interest in the preservation
of life, the impingement of religious belief does not reflect a constitutional ques-
tion. See id. at 661. As for the former, the court found the Eighth Amendment's
protection irrelevant to situations other than the imposition of penal sanctions.
See id. at 662.
65. See id. at 663.
870 [Vol. 40
MODELING THE GARDEN
pirator used by Karen could not cure or improve her condi-
tion, but rather only prolong her death.66 This fact distin-
guished Karen's situation from previous cases in which the
court ordered treatments,67 because Karen had no realistic
chance for recovery.68 The court applied a balancing test of
sorts: "the State's interest contra weakens and the individ-
ual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims."69 The court concluded that
the bodily intrusion-twenty-four hour intensive nursing
care, antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a catheter,
and a feeding tube-favored Karen's interests over the
state's." Therefore, the court granted Joseph Quinlan full
guardianship of his daughter, and allowed him to discontinue
the use of the respirator.'
Both state and federal courts widely accepted this water-
shed opinion by the New Jersey court.72 Prior to the 1976
Quinlan decision, no state had recognized a patient's right to
set limits on life-prolonging medical treatment.73 Since Quin-
lan, over forty states have passed "living will" statutes that
give effect to a person's choice of medical treatment in the
event of incompetency.74 The New Jersey decision not only in-
fluenced the law, but public opinion on the issue as well.
Since the Quinlan decision, public opinion polls reveal an im-
pressive shift from a majority opposed to "pulling the plug" on
permanently comatose patients, to a large majority, some-
times nearing ninety percent, in favor of such measures."
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court influenced the legal
66. See id. at 663-64.
67. See John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971)
(ordering blood transfusions for a Jehovah's Witness, despite that religion's ab-
horrence of such procedures); Mountain Lakes Bd. of Educ. v. Maas, 152 A.2d
394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (ordering compulsory vaccination, over the
strongest religious objections, to protect the public health).
68. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
69. Id. at 664.
70. See id.
7L See id. at 670-72 (holding that Mr. Quinlan could order discontinuation
of medical treatment only if the doctors and ethics committee at the hospital
determined there was no reasonable possibility of Karen ever emerging from
her comatose state).
72. See Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflec-
tions, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 862 (1992).
73. See id. at 861.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 860-61.
2000]
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community, and the public at large, regarding how to treat
terminally ill patients.
c. Sexual Assault /Rape Standard
The New Jersey Supreme Court has progressively ex-
posed many contradictions in rape law."8 The seminal case is
State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S." In M.T.S., the
New Jersey Supreme Court defined the essential elements of
the crime of sexual assault, 8 with specific emphasis on the
perplexing and controversial role of force in that crime."
More specifically, the court focused on the role of force in the
context of "acquaintance rape.""
The case stemmed from an encounter between a seven-
teen-year-old defendant and a fifteen-year-old victim.81 The
trial court determined that, while the victim had consented to
a session of kissing and heavy petting with the defendant, she
did not consent to the actual sexual act.82 Accordingly, the
court found the defendant guilty of second-degree sexual as-
76. See Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent
Theory in Rape Law is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 63 (1996).
77. State ex rel M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
78. The New Jersey sexual assault statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c
(West 1999), reads as follows:
An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual pene-
tration with another person under any one of the following circum-
stances:
(1) The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does
not sustain severe personal injury;
(2) The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital,
prison or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disci-
plinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, profes-
sional or occupational status;
(3) The victim is at least 16 but less than 18 years old and:
(a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the
third degree; or
(b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the
victim; or
(c) The actor is a foster parent, a guardian, or stands in loco
parentis within the household;
(4) The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor
is at least four years older than the victim.
Id.
79. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1267.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1267-68.
82. See id. at 1269. The trial court concluded that rape had occurred, with-
out believing the testimony of the victim, who claimed to be asleep at the time of
penetration. See id.
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sault.' On appeal, the New Jersey appellate court reversed
the trial court, determining that the absence of force pre-
cluded a finding of sexual assault.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court reinstated the trial
court's ruling.85 The court found the statutory term "physical
force" to have no obvious or plain meaning, leaving it up to
the court to define. 6 Reviewing the history of American and
English rape law, the court criticized the requirement of
physical resistance by the victim in sexual assault cases,
stating that "the law put the rape victim on trial.'
The court then attempted to define "physical force" with-
out putting the victim on trial. The court determined that
when the legislature defined sexual assault 9 it intended to
align rape with the law of assault and battery, rather than
with traditional rape law.9" Citing scholarship,9 research,9"
and legislative intent, 3 the court declared that "any act of
sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the
affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the
specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of sexual as-
sault."94 Specifically, in redefining "physical force," the court
stated that "physical force in excess of that inherent in the act
of sexual penetration is not required for such penetration to
be unlawful."95 In the most striking phrase of the decision,
the court concluded, "reasonable people do not engage in acts
of penetration without permission, and it is unlawful to do
SO. "
96
The M.T.S. decision changed rape law in New Jersey and
those jurisdictions adopting the New Jersey standard.97 First,
83. See id.
84. See State ex rel M.T.S., 588 A2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992),
rev'd, 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
85. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1280.
86. See id. at 1269-70.
87. See id. at 1270-74.
88. Id. at 1272.
89. See supra note 78.
90. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1276.
91. See id. at 1272-74.
92. See id. at 1273.
93. See id. at 1274-76.
94. Id. at 1277.
95. Id.
96. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279.
97. See infra note 106.
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the decision effectively reads the "physical force" requirement
out of the rape statute.18 Second, the court protects the vic-
tims of acquaintance rape from having their sexual history
become the focus of criminal investigations and trials." The
M.T.S. decision forces courts to focus only on the incident in
question and whether the defendant reasonably believed,
based on the defendant's knowledge at the time, that the vic-
tim consented.' 0 Focusing on the allegedly unlawful incident
removes the victim's past sexual history with the defendant
from judicial and public scrutiny."' Third, the decision places
the crime of sexual assault, standing alone, in the category of
violent crime.0 2 "Implicit in such a holding is the concept that
any sexual conduct is potentially violent because it can be an
infringement of personal autonomy. It is the meaningful con-
sent of both parties that defeats the presumption of violence
and saves the conduct from criminal sanction." 3 Finally, and
most significantly for rape victims, the M.T.S. decision evalu-
ates sexual assault based on the consent, rather than resis-
tance, of the victim.0 As the court stated, "[i]n defining force
by measuring the degree of resistance by the victim, [courts
had reintroduced] the resistance requirement, when the
proper focus ought to have been on whether the contact was
unpermitted."' 1 Thus, in New Jersey, rape inquiries now
center on the consent of the victim, instead of the degree of
98. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279 ("In short, in order to convict under the
sexual assault statute in cases such as these, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was sexual penetration and that it was accom-
plished without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the alleged vic-
tim.").
99. See Linda Robayo, Note, The Glen Ridge Trial: New Jersey's Cue to
Amend its Rape Shield Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 272, 312-15 (1994).
100. See id. at 314-15.
101. See id. at 315.
102. The crime of rape had its legal origins in laws designed to protect the
property rights of men in their wives and daughters. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at
1273. Although the crime evolved into an offense against women, reformers ar-
gued that vestiges of the old law remained, particularly in the understanding of
rape as a crime against the purity or chastity of a woman. See id.; see also
Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaning-
ful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1205 (1998).
103. Bossing, supra note 102, at 1224-25.
104. See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1276.
105. Id. at 1275-76 (quoting People v. Patterson, 410 N.W.2d 733 (Mich.
1987)).
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his or her resistance.10 6
d. Education Reform
As with its criminal procedure decisions, where the New
Jersey Supreme Court relied on the state constitution to pro-
tect individual rights, 7 the court used independent state con-
stitutional grounds to strike down the state's system of fi-
nancing public education. 8 Before 1973, advocates of school-
finance reform depended solely on the U.S. Supreme Court
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to provide the basis for eliminating disparities in fund-
ing among school districts. 9 However, in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez,' the U.S. Supreme
Court considered Texas' school financing system, which relied
heavily on local property taxes and therefore disproportion-
ately affected children in poor districts, and found it constitu-
tional. "' Since most state education finance systems resem-
bled that of Texas,"' Rodriguez effectively closed the door on
further challenges under the federal Constitution."'
Just thirteen days later,"' the New Jersey Supreme
Court reopened the door for school reformers 15 in Robinson v.
Cahill."'6 The court held that the New Jersey school finance
106. The M.T.S. decision has garnered the high court of New Jersey both
praise and criticism from legal scholars. Compare Maya Manian, Book Note, 20
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 333 (1997) (praising an affirmative consent rule), with
Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 AF. L.
REV. 19 (1996) (criticizing same). A few other jurisdictions have adopted the
New Jersey approach to defining sexual assault. See United States v. Webster,
37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993); Florida v. Sedia, 614 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
107. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
108. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) [hereinafter Robin-
son I].
109. See G. Alan Tarr, Robinson v. Cahill and the New Judicial Federalism,
59 ALB. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
110. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
111. See Tarr, supra note 109, at 1753.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. The first Robinson decision was handed down on April 3, 1973. See
Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
115. See Tarr, supra note 109, at 1753.
116. In total there were seven separate Robinson v. Cahill decisions: Robin-
son I, 303 A.2d at 273; Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A-2d 65 (N.J. 1973) [hereinafter
Robinson II]; Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Robinson
III]; Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Robinson IV];
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system violated the Education Clause".7 of the New Jersey
Constitution,"8 which requires that the state provide all chil-
dren with a "thorough and efficient system of free public
schools.""' Beyond providing the opportunity for school-
finance reform, the Robinson series of decisions2 reflect per-
haps the best example of the New Jersey Supreme Court's ac-
tivism.
21
In Robinson I, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of the statutes providing for the financ-
ing of elementary and secondary schools.'22 The funding was
derived from local taxation of real property, state aid, and
federal aid."n This system caused a disparity in the number
of dollars spent per pupil in New Jersey school districts, due
to the unequal value of taxable real property within dis-
tricts.2 4 In short, low-income districts received less money
per pupil.'25 Due to this disparity, the court found a violation
of the Education Clause.' While the court noted that reli-
ance on local taxes to cover a portion of the education costs is
permissible, it clearly placed the burden of remedying any
constitutional violation upon the state government, rather
than the local municipalities. According to the court,
"[w]hatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the
State's to rectify it. If local government fails, the State gov-
ernment must compel it to act, and if the local government
cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its con-
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) [hereinafter Robinson V]; Robinson
v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) [hereinafter Robinson VII; and Robinson v.
Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) [hereinafter Robinson VII].
117. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1, c. 1.
118. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 294-97.
119. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1, cl. 1.
120. See supra note 116.
121. For an excellent review of the entire series of Robinson decisions and the
New Jersey Supreme Court's progressivism in general, see RICHARD LEHNE,
THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1978).
122. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 276.
123. Local taxes yielded 67% of the total operating expenses, while the state
and federal aid consisted of 28% and 5%, respectively. See id.
124. See id.
125. The court recognized that equalizing the dollar input would not neces-
sarily assure equality in educational results. See id. at 277. But according to
the court, "it is nonetheless clear that there is a significant connection between
the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity." Id.
126. See id. at 297.
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tinuing obligation."'27
After finding the scheme unconstitutional,' the court
handed down a series of extraordinary orders.'29 In Robin-
son II, the court stated that it would not disturb the statutory
scheme for school funding immediately.3 ' Rather, if the leg-
islature failed to enact legislation compatible with Robinson I
by the end of 1974 (eighteen months from the date of Robin-
son II), then the court vowed to step in."' Due to a lack of
agreement, the legislature failed to enact legislation by the
deadline. '32 Therefore, in Robinson III, the court again faced
an unconstitutional scheme."3  Attempting not to infringe
upon the legislature's power, the court permitted the uncon-
stitutional system to continue for the 1975-1976 school year
without alteration and ordered another rehearing." When
the legislature again failed to adopt an acceptable financing
scheme,"' the court reluctantly acted to prevent another
school year's passing under the unconstitutional system."6
The court altered the distribution of funding under the cur-
rent system and enjoined state officials from disbursing cer-
127. Id. at 294. The court ended by noting that the state never properly
spelled out the content of the constitutionally mandated educational opportu-
nity. The court called the present scheme a "patchy product reflecting provin-
cial contests rather than a plan sensitive only to the constitutional mandate."
Id. at 297.
128. See Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 298.
129. At the conclusion of Robinson I, the court granted the legislature time to
establish another statutory system and ordered another hearing. See id. The
key question the court left open was whether the judiciary may order funds to
be distributed upon terms other than legislated ones. See id. The court an-
swered this question in the affirmative with Robinson IV. See infra text accom-
panying notes 135-38.
130. See Robinson I, 306 A 2d 65, 66 (N.J. 1973).
131 See id.
132. See Robinson I, 335 A.2d 6, 6-7 (N.J. 1975).
133. See id.
134 See id. The rehearing was scheduled to address four subjects: (1) the
method of determining the definition of "a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools"; (2) the extent of the power of the court to order relief from, or
changes in, the statutory financing scheme on a temporary or permanent basis;
(3) to what extent the court should exercise such power; and (4) whether the
court should appoint a special master to hear argument and make recommenda-
tions to the court as to the definition and its applications. See id. at 7.
135. See Robinson IV, 351 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1975).
136. See id. at 720 ("We forthwith reject the submission that we should do
nothing. It is past three years since the system was held unconstitutional in the
Law Division. Our position that the court would act at least for 1976-1977 was
implicit in the January 23, 1975, order.").
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tain funds under the old law."' However, the court limited
the applicability of the decision to the 1976-1977 school
year.138
Finally, the legislature enacted the Public School Educa-
tion Act of 1975,3' which fundamentally altered the school
funding system. In Robinson V,40 the court found the new
system facially constitutional under the assumption that it
was fully funded.1'4 However, after legislative inaction failed
to provide funding for the 1975 Act, the supreme court again
enjoined every public officer, state, county, or municipal, from
expending funds for the support of free public schools unless
the legislature took timely action by July 1, 1976. " As the
deadline approached, New Jersey teachers, students, gov-
ernment officials, and justices all held their breath in antici-
pation of the funding."' Unfortunately, the legislature again
failed to provide funding, triggering the injunction and clos-
ing the New Jersey school system.' Finally, on July 9, 1976,
the court lifted the injunction after the legislature finally
passed proper funding for the 1975 Act.
4 5
The seven Robinson decisions accounted for more than
three years of legislative inaction,'46 and greatly influenced
other jurisdictions. "7 In fact, Robinson v. Cahill was "proba-
bly the most important ruling--or set of rulings-in state
137. More accurately, the court ordered:
The State Treasurer, the State Commissioner of Education and any
other State officers concerned with the receipt or disbursement of mon-
eys to be appropriated by the Legislature for local educational purposes
for the school year 1976-77 are hereby enjoined from disbursing mini-
mum support and save-harmless funds designated by this opinion in
accordance with existing law, and are directed to distribute and dis-
burse said funds in accordance with the incentive equalization aid for-
mula of [the 1970 Act].
Id. at 724.
138. See id. at 723-24.
139. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.7A (repealed 1996).
140. Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976).
141. See id. at 139.
142. See Robinson VI, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976).
143. See LEHNE, supra note 121, at 1-3.
144. See id. at 2.
145. See Robinson VII, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976).
146. See LEHNE, supra note 121, at 1-2.
147. In the first seven years after Robinson, eleven state supreme courts
heard state constitutional challenges to school finance systems. See Tarr, supra
note 109, at 1754.
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constitutional law in the last quarter century."148 While to
some extent the Robinson decisions were a failure, 149 they
nevertheless demonstrated the New Jersey Supreme Court's
dedication to upholding the state constitution.5 '
B. The California Supreme Court
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court today, the California
Supreme Court of the middle decades of the twentieth cen-
tury maintained a reputation for judicial activism and pro-
gressivism. However, while the New Jersey Supreme Court
has maintained and furthered its progressive reputation, 5'
the California Supreme Court has failed to keep up. This sec-
tion summarizes the California situation by discussing (1) the
history of California Supreme Court chief justices; (2) the ac-
tivist nature and reputation of the court; (3) the rejection of
Chief Justice Bird and two other supreme court justices in the
retention election of 1986, which lead to the demise of the
court; and (4) the reputation of the court since the Bird con-
troversy.
1. History of Chief Justices: 1940 to 1986
Ironically, as in New Jersey, the 1940s served as an im-
portant time in the history of activism of the California Su-
preme Court.5 2 While New Jersey reformulated its state con-
stitution to create a powerful supreme court, California
appointed two new justices to their high court in 1940. Gov-
ernor Culbert Olson, the first California democratic governor
of the twentieth century, appointed Chief Justice Phil S. Gib-
son 153 and Associate Justice Roger J. Traynor, who later be-
came chief justice upon Gibson's retirement in 1964.11 Chief
148. Id. at 1753.
149. The rulings did not initiate an equalization of funding among New Jer-
sey school districts, nor did they promote a major increase in funding of educa-
tion in New Jersey. In fact, in 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court again in-
validated the school finance statutes in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1990). See generally Tarr, supra note 109, at 1755.
150. See Tarr, supra note 109, at 1753-55.
151. See supra Part IH.A.
152. See supra Part II.A..
153. Originally, Governor Olson appointed Gibson as an Associate Justice in
August 1939. After the death of Chief Justice Waste in June 1940, Olson ele-
vated Gibson to the position of Chief Justice. See PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING
JUDGES 96 (1981).
154. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 95-99.
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Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Traynor's successor, Donald
Wright, brought the California Supreme Court to prominence
for judicial activism. In fact, when Wright retired in 1977,
the court "was generally regarded as the best state court sys-
tem in the country."'55
Before 1940, however, the picture of California judges
was not of activist judicial scholars, but rather of chaotic and
incompetent jurists. 5 ' Administratively, the lower courts had
overlapping jurisdictions and lacked centralized control.1 7
Chief Justice Gibson drafted rules of appeal,15 reorganized
lower courts, and created the Commission on Judicial Per-
formance to expose judicial incompetence."5  Further,
throughout Gibson's tenure, the court began formulating
unique legal decisions and gaining respect as an activist
court.
160
While Gibson brought stability and leadership to a disor-
ganized court, Traynor gained a reputation as an author of
"scholarly judicial opinions, which often pioneered doctrinal
developments and were followed elsewhere in the country....
By the time he became chief justice, Traynor was nationally
known among lawyers as one of the great judges of his time,
ranked with Learned Hand and perhaps a few others."1 6'
Traynor's towering reputation at the time he became chief
justice in 1964 only grew during his tenure as the leader of
the high court.6  Like Gibson and Traynor, Chief Justice
155. Id. at 96.
156. See id. at 97.
157. See id.
158. Gibson actually did not write the rules, but rather supervised the work
of the court's reporter of decisions, Bernard E. Witkin. Witkin later rose to
prominence in California law after authoring numerous books. See STOLZ, su-
pra note 153, at 97.
159. The Commission on Judicial Performance filled a void in the California
system. Until its formation in 1960, removal of judges occurred only by theo-
retical methods such as impeachment, concurrent resolution of the legislature,
recall, and reelection defeat (which later moved from the realm of theory into
practice). See id. at 98. Gibson's commission, composed of judges, lawyers, and
non-lawyers, was empowered to hold hearings and make recommendations to
the supreme court that the court remove a judge for misconduct. See id. Forty-
seven states copied Gibson's plan. See id.
160. See infra Part II.B.2.
161. STOLZ, supra note 153, at 99.
162. See Baum & Canon, supra note 20, at 99 (describing Traynor as "one of
the great figures of the law in [the twentieth] century"); see infra Part II.B.2.
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Wright was also a dynamic leader.1" While resolving embar-
rassing issues on the court,"M the Wright court continued to
take an activist approach to judging cases. 65 A larger-than-
life figure, Wright "exude[d] dignity, open-mindedness, fair-
ness, and compassion."66
In sum, during the Gibson-Traynor-Wright years, the
California Supreme Court "was regarded as an innovative,
independent, and activist tribunal."67 However, the Califor-
nia court failed to continue the judicial activism after
Wright's retirement, due in large part to the lack of a promi-
nent chief justice to continue the legacy of progressivism left
by Gibson, Traynor, and Wright." Unlike her predecessors,
163. Appointed by Ronald Reagan in 1970, Wright held the office of high jus-
tice until 1977. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 96-100.
164. Perhaps Wright's greatest accomplishment involved the removal of a
colleague, Associate Justice Marshall McComb. Appointed in 1955, McComb
became senile but refused to retire. See id. at 100. McComb often fell asleep on
the bench and wrote very few opinions. Adding to the difficulty of the situation,
McComb was consistently conservative, making any attempt at removing him
from office by his more liberal counterparts suspect on political grounds. See id.
Wright persuaded his colleagues to face the problem ignored by both Traynor
and Gibson. Wright engineered a constitutional amendment providing that
whenever a supreme court justice's competence is challenged, a special tribunal
of seven randomly selected court of appeal justices should determine the issue.
See id. at 101. The tribunal recommended that McComb retire because of se-
nility.
Only in the final stages did the case attract public notice but at no
point was any suggestion made that McComb's removal was politically
inspired nor were the details of McComb's bizarre behavior stressed.
Removing McComb was the most visible administrative accomplish-
ment of Wright's tenure. For a liberal court to rid itself of a senile but
also blatantly conservative justice without charges of political motiva-
tion and without public discussion of his newsworthy misbehavior was
a triumph of administrative skill.
Id.
165. See infra Part II.B.2; see also Mary Cornelia Porter, State Supreme
Courts and the Warren Court: Some Old Inquiries for a New Situation, in STATE
SUPREME COURTs: POLIcYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 3,
9 (quoting Chief Justice Wright as declaring that "only the judiciary can guar-
antee that 'general values' will endure and that the rights of all, including those
of impotent minorities will be protected as the Constitution requires").
166. STOLZ, supra note 153, at 100. Further descriptions of Wright included,
"loved as well as admired .... [It was] nearly impossible to get angry with him
or to be jealous of his preferment. He led by gentle persuasion more than by
force of will or the powers of his office." Id.
167. John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court:
1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1461, 1465 (1998).
168. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Rose Bird Myth, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1992, at
86. See also infra Part IV.C.
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Chief Justice Rose Bird, successor to Wright, came under fire
for the progressive decisions of her court.169 Further, the
court "change[d] direction""1 ' entirely from liberal activism to
a more moderate jurisprudence after Bird's removal from of-
fice. 
171
2. Activist Decisions of the Court: 1940 to 1986
"The California Supreme Court has a long tradition of
civil-rights activism."1 7 For decades during the middle part of
the twentieth century, "the California justices.., pursued an
activist course boldly and openly."171 While the entire spec-
trum of the California Supreme Court's activist decisions is
beyond the scope of this comment, examples of progressive
decisions highlight the significance and prominence of the
court. Three main areas of decisions earned the court its
reputation as an activist tribunal: (a) tort law; (b) criminal
law; and (c) state constitutional law.
a. Tort Law
In the area of tort law, the California Supreme Court
pioneered new areas of liability in the middle decades of the
twentieth century.' In 1944, Justice Traynor wrote a con-
curring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company,1
71
calling for the manufacturer's strict liability (i.e., regardless
of negligence) in cases involving defective products."' Even-
tually, the entire court supported Traynor's position, adopting
it as the majority decision in the 1963 case of Greenman v.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 250-54. One possible reason for the
increased criticism for the Bird court's decisions was the lack of uniformity on
the court. Gibson, Traynor, and Wright commanded national attention and
thus, their associate justices often fell in line with the decision of the lead jus-
tice. Decisions during the Bird era were riddled with dissents and concurring
opinions. See Barnett, supra note 168, at 85-86 ("Gibson, Traynor, and Wright
may have attracted less opposition to their activist decisions because they often
had no in-house critics pointing out how far-reaching those decisions were.").
170. Barnett, supra note 168, at 85-86.
171. See infra Part II.B.3-4.
172. John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial
Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81, 83 (1986) [hereinafter Culver
& Wold, Rose Bird].
173. Id.
174. See Barnett, supra note 168, at 86.
175. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
176. See id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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Yuba Power Production, Inc."' In Greenman, the court held
the manufacturer of a defective power tool strictly liable for
the injuries it caused."8 While academic articles had urged
strict liability before Traynor's Escola opinion, it was
Traynor's receptiveness to creative ideas that gave the doc-
trine of strict liability judicial support and prominence. 9
The fall of sovereign immunity furthered the California
Supreme Court's reputation as a trailblazer in the area of tort
law. Adopted from the English common law rule that "the
king can do no wrong," sovereign immunity exempted the
government from liability based on the actions of its ser-
vants.' 0 While other courts attacked sovereign immunity by
formulating exceptions to the rule, the California Supreme
Court abolished the doctrine entirely in Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital.8' Traynor called the doctrine "mistaken and un-
just," and described it as an "anachronism, without rational
basis, [that had] existed only by the force of inertia."'82 The
California legislature responded to Muskopf by enacting a
complex, yet thorough, body of law on the issue of sovereign
immunity."
The activist nature of the California court in tort law did
not end with Traynor's retirement in 1970. Rather, under the
leadership of newly appointed Chief Justice Wright, the court
addressed the pitfalls of traditional negligence principles in
Li v. Yellow Cab Company."M In Li, the court substituted the
defense of contributory negligence with comparative negli-
gence.' Li, like Muskopf, caused a reexamination of the tort
law structure by the California legislature. Further, although
promptly overturned by the legislature, the court's 1978 deci-
sion in Coulter v. Superior Court8 ' held that a social host who
served an obviously intoxicated guest could be liable for dam-
ages for injuries caused by the guest. Finally, in 1980, the
177. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
178. See id. at 900-01.
179. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 77-78.
180. See id. at 78.
181. Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
182. Id. at 460.
183. See generally James A. Cobey, The New California Governmental Tort
Liability Statutes, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 16 (1964).
184. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
185. See Barnett, supra note 168, at 86.
186. Coulter v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1978).
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Bird-led California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories,'87 invented the concept of "market share" liability,
reopening the entire question of causation in tort law. Taken
together, Li, Muskopf, Greenwood, and Sindell demonstrate
the California Supreme Court's history of creative and pro-
gressive decisions in the area of tort law.'88
b. Criminal Law
The California Supreme Court's decisions in criminal law
provide some of the most controversial examples of judicial
activism. These cases divide into two topics: (1) cases where
the California Supreme Court preceded, or disagreed with,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions; and (2) cases involving the
death penalty.
First, the California court showed its activism in cases
where it differed from or preceded decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court. For example, California applied the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence illegally obtained by the government in
1955, six years before the U.S. Supreme Court mandate in
Mapp v. Ohio.'89 Traynor's opinion in People v. Cahan90 pro-
vides an example of the California court setting the standard
for the U.S. Supreme Court to follow.'9' Beyond merely es-
tablishing an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, the court developed its own
search and seizure jurisprudence during the six years be-
tween Cahan and Mapp. 9' For example, California refused to
apply the exclusionary rule retroactively through the habeas
corpus procedure, and permitted legislative revision of the
187. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
188. For further discussion regarding the tort law developments of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court during 1962 to 1972 period, see Mathew 0. Tobriner, Ret-
rospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 5
(1972); see also Baum & Canon, supra note 20, at 98 (ranking California the
fourth most innovative state supreme court in propensity to tort law activism in
the postwar years).
189. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
190. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
191 See Barnett, supra note 168, at 86.
192. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 80 ("In the six-year interval between Ca-
han and Mapp, the California court, largely through Traynor opinions, devel-
oped a California law of search and seizure that was in many ways more coher-
ently focused on the issue of abusive police practices than the federal
constitutional law that later emerged."); see also Paulsen, Criminal Law Ad-
ministration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CAL. L. REV. 103 (1965).
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right.'93 Eventually, however, federal law mandated all state
courts to follow a uniform minimum law of search and sei-
zure."" The search and seizure cases demonstrated the Cali-
fornia court's willingness to not only rule progressively, but
also to follow up its rulings with further decisions to pioneer
an undeveloped area of law.
The California Supreme Court also preceded the U.S.
Supreme Court in prohibiting discrimination in the selection
of jurors for capital cases. The California Supreme Court
handed down People v. Wheeler'5 in 1978, barring racial dis-
crimination in the use of preemptory challenges to prospec-
tive jurors. Wheeler was decided eight years before the U.S.
Supreme Court proscribed such discrimination in Batson v.
Kentucky.'96 In Wheeler, the court relied on the California,
rather than federal, Constitution, and ignored the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama ,'9 which at
that time permitted racial discrimination in the use of pre-
emptory challenges.'98 This reliance on the state constitution
allowed the California Supreme Court to side-step U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent and provide criminal defendants pro-
tection against discrimination in the use of preemptory chal-
lenges.
In addition to ruling contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the California Supreme Court also demonstrated its inde-
pendence by making unpopular decisions that extended
greater rights to criminal defendants. Under Chief Justice
Bird, the court "steadily extended application of the exclu-
sionary rule, imposed strict standards upon the admissibility
of confessions, and broadened its test regarding insanity pleas
in a manner favorable to those entering such pleas."'99
The second area of criminal law activism by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court involves capital punishment. In its 1972
193. See In re Harris, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., concurring).
The U.S. Supreme Court later returned to Traynor's view on this issue, see
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
194. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 80.
195. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
196. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that Batson applied when the defendant and excluded
juror are not of the same race).
197. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
198. See Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 762. See generally CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
199. Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 86.
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decision of People v. Anderson,"'0 the court declared the state's
death penalty unconstitutional, thus anticipating the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. that same
year.2°2 Despite the popularity of the death penalty,"'3 the
California court found that capital punishment violated the
California Constitution's prohibition on "cruel or unusual"
punishment."4 Almost immediately after Anderson, Califor-
nia voters approved an initiative changing the California
Constitution to reflect the federal Constitution's ban on "cruel
and unusual" punishment."5
Even after the voters effectively overturned Anderson,
the California Supreme Court took a uniquely anti-death
penalty stance.0 6 From 1979 through 1986, the court af-
firmed only five of sixty-four death sentences.0 7 Chief Justice
Bird led the anti-capital punishment charge by dissenting in
all five of the affirming cases .0 8 As of 1986, state high courts
nationwide had reversed death sentences in only forty-three
percent of cases since capital punishment's reinstatement in
1976, while the federal courts reversed such sentences sixty
percent of the time.' 9 Comparing these numbers to the
nearly ninety-five percent reversal rate for the California Su-
preme Court makes evident the California court's distinctive
position. Beyond reversing death sentences in specific cases,
the court also "provided procedural standards highly protec-
tive of capital defendants.""0 These safeguards afforded capi-
tal defendants almost limitless legal resources, including the
assistance of psychologists and psychiatrists, expert wit-
200. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
201. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
202. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 83; see also Gerald F.
Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (1989) [hereinafter
Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments].
203. Data from public opinion polls at the peak of the anti-death penalty pe-
riod indicate that 75% of California residents supported capital punishment.
See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 87.
204. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 81.
205. Id.
206. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 86.
207. See Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments, supra note 202, at
237.
208. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 87.
209. See id. at 86. The U.S. Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment
with its decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
210. Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 86.
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nesses, two lawyers, a full-time investigator, and the admis-
sion of virtually any evidence in the penalty phase.211 Profes-
sor Gerald F. Uelmen summarized the court's position re-
garding the death penalty this way:
The approach of the Bird court in reviewing death penalty
judgments reflected a norm of reversal, in which the court
paid little heed to principles such as abstention, the sub-
stantial evidence rule, and the principle of harmless error.
Doubts, particularly those involving choice of sentence,
were resolved in favor of reversal because of the severity
and finality of the judgment being reviewed.212
Whether anticipating decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
ruling contrary to it, or granting capital defendants expansive
rights, the California Supreme Court bucked the judicial
trends and popular opinion to rule independently and pro-
gressively in criminal law matters.
c. California Constitutional Law
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, 3 the high court in
California determined issues of constitutional law independ-
ently of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, often relying
on the state constitution.24 Also as in New Jersey, the most
controversial decision in this area related to California's edu-
cation finance scheme.2 15 In Serrano v. Priest,216 the court held
that the existing system of funding for elementary and secon-
dary education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
California Constitution. The court labeled education as a
"fundamental interest," requiring the legislature to equalize
expenditures per public school child throughout the state.2 7
In addition to school finance reform, the California
court's dedication to civil rights activism through the state
constitution manifested itself in three other cases involving
discrimination. In Mulkey v. Reitman,218 the court prohibited
21L See id.
212. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments, supra note 202, at 239.
213. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
214. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 83.
215. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
216. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
217. See id. at 1258. The U.S. Supreme Court failed to follow California's
lead, ruling against plaintiffs in a similar case. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
218. Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966).
88720001
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
realtors and apartment managers from discriminating based
on race in the sale or rental of housing. That decision, upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court, invalidated an initiative ap-
proved by the California electorate in 1964, which permitted
such discrimination.219 Two decisions that preceded similar
cases in the federal court also showed the California Supreme
Court's dedication to individual rights. In Perez v. Lippold,220
in 1948, the court invalidated the state anti-miscegenation
statute, a result not reached by the U.S. Supreme Court until
almost two decades later."' Similarly, the California Su-
preme Court's 1972 decision striking down the state's prohibi-
tion of abortion222 preceded Roe v. Wade."
Via the application of procedural due process, the court
reacted "to the plight of the economically downtrodden" by
ruling in favor of the poor in many cases.2 4 For example, in
Blair v. Pitchess2 ' and Randone v. Appellate Department,28
the California Supreme Court declared the claim and delivery
law, and a principal element of its prejudgment attachment
law, unconstitutional.2 7  In cases involving civil rights, the
plight of the poor, and discrimination, "the California jurists
staked out more activist positions under state law than the
U.S. Supreme Court was willing to take under federal law.2 8
These state constitutional law decisions garnered the
California Supreme Court praise from commentators. One
scholar described the majority position of the court during
Chief Justice Bird's tenure as "innovative and activist, sym-
pathetic toward the poor, especially careful of the rights of
civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants, inclined toward the
expansion of individual rights against government and busi-
ness enterprises, and less concerned about property and cor-
219. See id. at 827-28.
220. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
221. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
222. See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1972).
223. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
224. See Tobriner, supra note 188, at 12.
225. Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242 (Cal. 1971).
226. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 488 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1971).
227. See Tobriner, supra note 188, at 12. Specifically, the Randone court
held that a creditor's interest could never sufficiently compel the attachment of
the debtor's necessities of life without notice and a judicial hearing to determine
the actual validity of the claim. See id.
228. Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 83.
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porate rights."229 This description also accurately portrayed
the court under the leadership of Gibson, Traynor, and
Wright." From even the brief outlines of the cases summa-
rized above, the activist, progressive nature of the California
Supreme Court of the middle part of the twentieth century is
evident. 1
3. Unraveling the Activist Court: the 1986 Retention
Elections
The judicial retention election of 1986 is commonly cred-
ited with the demise of the activist California Supreme
Court. 2 For example, in the area of criminal law, Professor
Uelmen noted, "[tihe revolution which demarcates this dra-
matic shift [from anti-death penalty to deference to death
sentences] was the retention election of November, 1986, in
which the voters of California removed Chief Justice Rose
Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz
Reynoso. "n 3 Before discussing the election issues resulting in
the removal of these three justices, this comment addresses
the method of selecting justices for the California Supreme
Court and the importance of the 1978 retention election to the
change in California.
a. Method of Selecting Judges and the 1978
Retention Election
Under the original California Constitution of 1849, su-
preme court justices faced contested elections for six-year
termsY4 In 1934, a constitutional initiative changed the se-
lection method to its present form.235 Appointment of a justice
is a three-step process: (1) the governor nominates a candi-
date for the high court; (2) the Commission on Judicial Ap-
229. Stephen R. Barnett, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-1982. For-
ward: The Emerging Court, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1141 (1983).
230. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 85-86.
231. For examples of the California Supreme Court's activism in the area of
education law, see id. at 83 n.27; see also Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist.,
382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963) (declaring that the California Constitution forbade de
facto, as well as de jure, racial segregation in the state's public schools-a posi-
tion not followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973)).
232. See Barnett, supra note 168, at 85.
233. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments, supra note 202, at 238.
234. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 82.
235. See id.
2000] 889
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
pointments approves the nomination by having at least two of
three members affirm the appointment; and (3) finally, the
newly appointed justice faces an initial retention vote at the
next gubernatorial election." The term of office for justices is
twelve years." When a newly appointed justice reaches the
end of the term of his or her predecessor on the bench, the
justice faces another retention election. 8
Chief Justice Bird faced her initial confirmation election
in November 1978, twenty months after her appointment. 9
Opponents of Bird began a campaign to unseat her based on
her lack of qualifications,4 controversial administrative ac-
tions,24' and, most significantly, the liberal opinions of the
court under her leadership. 242 Bird retained her position as
chief justice by less than three percentage points.243 Although
ultimately unsuccessful, the 1978 attack against Bird's reten-
tion demonstrated the vulnerability of justices on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.
236. See id. The non-partisan confirmation/retention ballot asks: "Shall
[name of justice] be elected to office for the term prescribed by law?" Id.
237. See John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Jus-
tices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348, 349 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Wold & Culver, Defeat of the Cali-
fornia Justices].
238. See id.
239. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 84.
240. Governor Brown appointed Bird as Chief Justice despite Bird's never
having been a judge at any level. At forty years of age, Bird's sole experience in
high state government was her three-year term as Brown's administrator of the
Agriculture and Services Agency. See STOLZ, supra note 153, at 84-85. Before
this assignment, Bird was a public defender in Santa Clara County, California.
See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 83.
241. Upon taking office, Bird appointed several of her associates to serve on
the Administrative Office of the Courts and on the Judicial Council. Further,
Bird hired new law clerks, replacing tenured clerks in these positions. Finally,
Bird also changed the locks on the doors at the Supreme Court Building. Some
insiders considered this an attempt to isolate the court. See id.
242. See People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the inju-
ries suffered by a young woman during a brutal sexual assault were not severe
enough to justify the sentence enhancement for inflicting "great bodily harm");
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1302 (Cal. 1978) (Bird, J., dissenting) (holding that requiring prop-
erty owners to pay markedly varying taxes on properties of similar market
value is unconstitutional). See generally STOLZ, supra note 153, at 193-265.
243. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 88.
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b. Restructuring the California Court
Six of the seven justices on the California Supreme Court
faced retention elections in 1986.2 4 Justices Edward Panelli,
Malcolm Lucas, and Stanley Mosk faced no opposition to their
retention.245 However, politicians, crime victims, and prosecu-
tors actively opposed Chief Justice Bird and Associate Jus-
tices Grodin and Reynoso. 6 The campaign against the three
justices was organized, well funded, and highly publicized.2 47
While most judicial retention elections occur without incident
or high voter turnout,248 the 1986 California retention election
actually drew voters to the booth.249
As with the 1978 attempt to unseat Bird, the 1986 reten-
tion election campaign focused on the liberal decisions of the
Bird-led California Supreme Court.2 50 "By the early 1980s,
the Bird Court was perceived as a tribunal stacked with lib-
eral justices, appointed by a liberal governor (Jerry Brown),
whose decisions, particularly in criminal law, collided [with
an] increasingly conservative electorate."" 1 Although the ac-
tivist Bird court followed the progressive pattern of previous
California Supreme Courts, 2 the California voters would no
longer tolerate this liberalism 253 and overwhelmingly voted to
remove all three justices.'
244 See Wold & Culver, Defeat of the California Justices, supra note 237, at
349.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 350 (estimating that those opposing retention spent $5.5 mil-
lion dollars on the campaign).
248. The California retention election of 1986 lacked the typical "voter fa-
tigue," which is the tendency of many voters to leave the portion of the ballots
dealing with the judiciary unmarked. See id. at 351.
249. See id. (stating that the issue of Bird's retention was a prominent, if not
the most prominent, issue of the entire 1986 California campaign).
250. For an alternative perspective on the motivation for the opposition to
the three justices, see the opinion of one of the ousted justices himself, Joseph
R. Grodin, Judicial Elections: The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365,
367 (1987) ("The prospect of replacing three members of the court with judges
appointed by the current governor-virtually assured of reelection-must have
been an appealing one.").
251. Culver, supra note 167, at 1466.
252. See supra Part lI.B.2.
253. See Culver & Wold, Rose Bird, supra note 172, at 89 ("In other words,
the historical liberal activism of the California Supreme Court merely may have
run afoul of the prevailing conservative political environment.").
254. Only 34% of voters voted to retain Chief Justice Bird, 40% voted to re-
tain Reynoso, and 43% to retain Grodin. On the other hand, those justices not
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4. Post-Bird California Court: 1986 to Present
The ousting of Bird, Grodin, and Reynoso caused a sig-
nificant philosophical change in the California Supreme
Court. After nearly fifty years of activism, moderate justices
took control of the court.25 Governor George Deukmejian
placed Associate Justice Malcolm Lucas in the chief justice's
chair, and added John Arguelles, David Eagleson, and Mar-
cus Kaufman to the court.256 Today, Stanley Mosk represents
the only justice remaining on the bench who took office before
the overhaul of the court in 1986."5 In short, the California
Supreme Court underwent a facelift beginning with the re-
tention election of 1986.
With the addition of four moderate justices, the attitude
and stature of the California Supreme Court certainly dif-
fered during the Lucas era." The Lucas court did not reverse
the fifty years of activist decisions,"s and with the lone excep-
tion of the death penalty,6' the post-Bird court has only over-
turned a select few of the liberal doctrines created by previous
courts.261 Nevertheless, the post-1986 California Supreme
Court "was a cautious court.... The Lucas court did not
break new judicial ground .... 26 ' Many praise Lucas for his
leadership of the California court under difficult and unique
circumstances.263 Consistently, however, descriptions of the
targeted for removal, Mosk, Panelli, and Lucas, all survived the election, re-
ceiving 74%, 79%, and 79% of the votes, respectively. See Wold & Culver, Defeat
of the California Justices, supra note 237, at 351-52. Comparing the results of
the California election to other retention elections across the nation further
demonstrates the uniqueness of that election. From 1934 to 1980, only 33
judges failed to win a retention election. Moreover, of the approximately 1500
judges facing retention ballots between 1972 and 1978, only 24 (less than 2%)
lost. Finally, never before had voters of any state rejected more than a single
judge of any appellate tribunal in a single election. See id. at 351.
255. See Culver, supra note 167, at 1466 n.33.
256. See id. at 1468. Upon Lucas's retirement in mid-1996, another Republi-
can governor, Pete Wilson, appointed Ronald George as Supreme Court Chief
Justice. Although somewhat less conservative than Lucas, George is considered
"closely aligned" with his predecessor. See id. at 1478.
257. See id. at 1478.
258. See Barnett, supra note 168, at 86.
259. See id. at 87.
260. See generally Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments, supra note
202, at 238-39.
261. See Culver, supra note 167, at 1488.
262. Id. 1476-77.
263. See generally, Gerald F. Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy, CAL. LAW., May
1996, at 29-30 [hereinafter Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy]; Barnett, supra note
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court hold it as "not creative,"2" "solidly conservative,"65 "def-
erential to legislative authority,"266 "a return to the main-
stream,"267 "non-interventionist, non-supervisory, and conflict-
avoiding."268 Although the California Supreme Court remains
sound in stature, clearly the progressive era of judicial poli-
cymaking, activist decisions, and national prominence is over.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The pre-1986 California Supreme Court and the New
Jersey Supreme Court of the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury serve as models of judicial activism. Since the California
high court's transformation,26 New Jersey stands alone as the
most progressive, activist state supreme court.270  With the
majority of state supreme courts providing little development
of state law,2 71 the issue becomes: why has the New Jersey
Supreme Court stood apart from other states in its progres-
sivism? Certain attributes of both the New Jersey Supreme
Court and New Jersey Constitution afford, at least in part, an
explanation for the judicial activism in the Garden State.272
California-and other jurisdictions wishing to develop an in-
dependent, progressive supreme court273-should model the
New Jersey system.274  By striving to emulate the unique
characteristics of the New Jersey court, the Golden State, and
other jurisdictions, can move closer to forming a prominent,
168, at 172.
264. Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy, supra note 263, at 29.
265. Barnett, supra note 168, at 85.
266. Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy, supra note 263, at 29.
267. Id. at 30 (quoting Professor J. Clark Kelso, McGeorge School of Law).
268. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments, supra note 202, at 291.
269. See supra Part I.B.3.
270. See supra Part H.A.2.
271. Numerous state supreme courts fail to take an independent, activist ap-
proach to decision making. See generally Esler, supra note 3, at 32 ("[T]he con-
servatism of most state political systems and entrenched legal and institutional
barriers work against widespread development of state constitutional law.").
Commentators specifically attacked at least two other state supreme courts for
their lack of activism. See Porter & Tarr, supra note 52, at 157 ("The high court
of Ohio, unlike that of California, Michigan, New Jersey, or Oregon, is neither
inclined, nor apparently equipped, to strike out and hold its own"); Ronald K.L.
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1095 (1985) (criticizing the Montana Supreme Court).
272. See infra Part IV.
273. See supra note 271.
274. See supra note 7.
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activist court of last resort.
IV. ANALYSIS
A closer look at the disposition of the justices of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, 5 the method of their selection and
tenure, 6 and the New Jersey Constitution's support of a
strong judiciary,"7 partially explains the activism of the New
Jersey judiciary. Moreover, throughout the discussion of the
attributes of the New Jersey court that contribute to its more
progressive, activist nature, this section identifies similar
characteristics which changed during the revamping of the
California Supreme Court.
A. Selection and Tenure Procedures in New Jersey and
Elsewhere
The vanguard decisions of the New Jersey Supreme
Court are not without criticism. Commentators and the pub-
lic disagree with the court's stance on many issues.278 How-
ever, the court has been able to overcome these criticisms,
and continue to rule in a progressive manner, due in part to
the selection and tenure procedures for New Jersey justices.
Unlike the majority of their counterparts in other states, the
New Jersey justices do not face popular election. 9 Not being
subject to elections permits the court to rule independently of
popularity and politics. This independence is crucial to the
decisions outlined above,"' as many of those rulings provide
rights and opportunities to historically disadvantaged or ig-
nored groups.
275. See infra Part IV.C.
276. See infra Part IV.A.
277. See infra Part IV.B.
278. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 106, at 23-24 (criticizing the M.T.S. rape
standard put forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court); Boris Moczula, 'Submit-
ted to the People: The Authority of the Electorate to Shape State Constitutional
Rights, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 849, 851 (1997) (recognizing that that in
1992 the people of New Jersey, dissatisfied with the state supreme court's in-
terpretation of the state constitution regarding the death sentence, amended
the constitution to specifically provide that it was not cruel or unusual punish-
ment to impose the death sentence on someone who purposely or knowingly in-
flicted serious bodily injury that resulted in death).
279. See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Ju-
diciaries and the Rule of Law, U. CIR. L. REV. 689 (1995).
280. See supra Part lI.A.2.
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In thirty-eight states, supreme court justices face some
type of popular election." 1 Ten states have partisan elections,
in which political parties nominate candidates for the
bench, 2 and ballots identify each candidate's political affilia-
tion.83 Supreme court justices in thirteen states face non-
partisan elections.' Non-partisan elections involve popular
elections with various candidates on the ballot, but without
identification of political parties.285 Both partisan and non-
partisan election of state supreme court justices requires each
judge to campaign against other candidates. Not only is the
campaigning time consuming and expensive, but it also sub-
jects justices to political pressures.288 Over time, this scheme
creates a bias in favor of judges most responsive to popular
opinion."
In an attempt to alleviate the political pressures associ-
ated with partisan and non-partisan elections, a reform
movement led fifteen statesm to adopt the "Missouri Plan,"
named after the first state to adopt it.2"89 The Missouri Plan
provides for initial selection by a nominating commission,
followed by an unopposed election wherein voters decide
whether to retain the judge.' This method of selection at-
tempts to balance the competing interests of judicial inde-
pendence with judicial accountability. 291 Specifically, the plan
institutes the unopposed retention election to minimize the
political pressures while the public retains the right to re-
move an ineffective justice. Adoption of the Missouri Plan,
281 See Croley, supra note 279, at 725-26.
282. See Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72
OR. L. REv. 459,459-60 (1993).
283. See Croley, supra note 279, at 725 (noting that the ten states with parti-
san judicial elections are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia).
284. The states that hold non-partisan elections are Georgia, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
285. See Scheuerman, supra note 282, at 461-62.
286. See Croley, supra note 279, at 728.
287. See id. at 727.
288. The states that adopted the Missouri Plan are Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. at 725.
289. See id. at 724.
290. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial
Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306 (1994); see also supra note 236.
291 See Aspin & Hall, supra note 290, at 306-07.
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however, has failed to provide the desired judicial independ-
ence and de-politicization of the judiciary."' A survey of
judges who face retention elections concluded, "[e]ven though
judges rarely lose retention elections ... three-fifths believe
judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judi-
cial behavior."293
The 1986 removal of three justices from the California
Supreme Court294 provided a clear example of how retention
elections remain political institutions and influence judges.29
In an admirable display of candor, former California Supreme
Court Justice Otto Kaus admitted that the pendancy of his
1982 retention election may have influenced his vote on a key
issue.296 Further, ousted California Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Grodin commented on the effect of the 1986 elections
on future justices as follows:
But that the poison is in the atmosphere, and that it must,
inevitably, erode to some extent the authority and inde-
pendence of the courts, even if it does not affect the way
judges decide cases--of that, I think, there can be no seri-
ous doubt. Whether our basic constitutional guarantees,
and our fundamental legal rights, can continue to flourish
in such an atmosphere is... part of the question of the
day.2
97
Finally, Justice Kaus humorously added, "[y]ou cannot ignore
that there are elections, any more than you can ignore that
there is a crocodile in your bathroom."298
In New Jersey, the selection process takes the politics out
of the courtroom and the crocodiles out of the bathroom. The
governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
292. See id. at 307-08. See generally Croley, supra note 279, at 726-27; Ger-
ald F. Uelmen, The Fattest Crocodile, 13 CRIM. JUST. 4 (1998).
293. Aspin & Hall, supra note 290, at 312.
294. See supra Part II.B.3.
295. "Many further believe that the removal of Bird and her colleagues...
weakened the independence of the California judiciary, and, by extension, of
judges across the land." Barnett, supra note 168, at 85.
296. See Grodin, supra note 250, at 368.
297. Id. at 369.
298. Baum, supra note 3, at 126. To underscore the effect of the retention
election, after a controversial case overturning an abortion law, one anti-
abortion organization and several legislators promised to campaign against the
retention of newly appointed Chief Justice George and Associate Justice Chin.
See Culver, supra note 167, at 1479-80. While this threat failed to materialize,
the vulnerability of the justices is apparent.
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new justices for a term of seven years.29 After this initial ap-
pointment, the same system is used for reappointing justices,
who then enjoy life tenure."'0 While this method has its po-
litical overtones,"1 the individual justices of the New Jersey
Supreme Court do not face any form of elections to retain
their position.0 2 The New Jersey method of selecting and re-
taining justices ensures judicial independence because jus-
tices are free from the stresses of elections. "Undoubtedly the
most important factor supporting the independence of the Ju-
diciary is the method of appointment used in New Jersey." 3
Without the political pressures faced by other state su-
preme court justices, the New Jersey Supreme Court can fo-
cus its attention on justice rather than popularity. As dem-
onstrated by the cases outlined above,0 4 the New Jersey court
sometimes makes unpopular decisions favoring historically
disadvantaged groups. Whether protecting the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants,05 securing the privacy of rape
victims,3 0 or addressing the racial disparity in public school
funding,0 7 the court continues to rule on principles of law
rather than politics. The judicial independence and security
provided by the selection and tenure methods is at least a
contributing factor in the New Jersey Supreme Court's activ-
ism.
B. The New Jersey State Constitution is Dedicated to a
Strong Judiciary
Because of the upsurge in state supreme courts' reliance
on state constitutions for the protection of individual rights, 8'
a strong, rights-oriented state constitution is essential for a
progressive state supreme court. Not surprisingly, the New
Jersey Supreme Court is supported by one of the nation's best
299. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3, c. 1 (amended 1983).
300. See supra Part II.A.1.
301. See DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD
ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY 36
(1995).
302. See Croley, supra note 279, at 725.
303. Wefing, supra note 20, at 714.
304. See supra Part II.A.2.
305. See supra Part ll.A.2.a.
306. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
307. See supra Part ll.A.2.d.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
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state constitutions."9 Two elements of the New Jersey Con-
stitution provide bases for the supreme court's activism: (1)
the protection of individual rights through an expansive bill
of rights, and (2) the establishment of an unified, modern
court system. While the New Jersey Constitution provides
these bases to support supreme court activism, the California
Constitution serves as an example of how to discourage such
judicial activism.
1. Protection of Individual Rights Under the New Jersey
Constitution
Activist state supreme courts require a state constitution
firmly supportive of individuals' rights. "The detailed struc-
ture of state constitutions is important because, generally
speaking, the more extensive the substantive and procedural
limitations a state constitution imposes . . . the greater the
likelihood of participation by the state supreme court in de-
termining the policy in the state."3 10 Further, since the U.S.
Supreme Court cannot review decisions based on "independ-
ent and adequate" state grounds,311 a rights-oriented state
constitution is necessary to insulate decisions from U.S. Su-
preme Court review.
In 1947, the New Jersey constitutional convention ex-
panded the state Bill of Rights to include equal rights for
women312 and collective bargaining rights for labor unions."3
Further, the new constitution established a modern anti-
discrimination provision, explicitly prohibiting racial segrega-
tion in schools. 14 These rights built upon the series of rights
contained in the 1875 Amendments to the previous constitu-
tion. The 1875 rights required a "thorough and efficient edu-
cation,"31' banned special laws passed by the legislature, and
309. See Daniel J. O'Hern, The New Jersey Constitution: A Charter to be
Cherished, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 827, 827 (1997). See generally Robert F.
Williams, New Jersey's State Constitutions: From Ridicule to Respect, N.J. LAW.,
June 1997, at 10-11.
310. TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 50-51.
311. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
312. See N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1 (replacing the word "men" with "per-
sons"); see also O'Hern, supra note 309, at 827.
313. See N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 19, cl. 1.
314. See id. art. I, para. 5, cl. 1.
315. Id. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1, cl. 1.
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provided for uniformity in taxation. 16 Together, the New Jer-
sey Bill of Rights grants the people of the Garden State sig-
nificant protection from government interference. In contrast
to New Jersey's strong Bill of Rights, California has a very
weak state bill of rights upon which its supreme court can
base decisions. 17
For the New Jersey Supreme Court, the granting of indi-
vidual protections in the new constitution provides a basis for
its progressive decisions. These provisions allow the New
Jersey Supreme Court to have a hand in the ultimate policy
in the state31 8 and to insulate itself from U.S. Supreme Court
review.319 With such constitutional support, it is not surpris-
ing that the New Jersey Supreme Court has been a beacon of
judicial activism and progressivism.
2. The New Jersey Constitution's Foundation for a
Strong Judiciary
Prior to the constitutional convention of 1947, the New
Jersey Supreme Court was an example of judicial ineffective-
ness and inaction.3 20 The Constitutional Convention Commit-
tee on the Judiciary ("Judiciary Committee") identified three
problem areas under the old New Jersey system: (1) jurisdic-
tional controversies engendered by rival courts of law and eq-
uity; (2) multiple functions of appellate court judges and reit-
erated appeals of the same case; and (3) total lack of busi-
nesslike organization, coordination, and supervision of the
courts as a whole.321 As of 1947, seventeen separate classes of
courts operated in the state, frustrating all attempts at uni-
formity and creating a jurisdictional maze for litigants.322 The
1947 constitution alleviated many of the structural defects in
the judiciary by unifying the courts of law and equity; grant-
ing the supreme court control over administration, practice,
316. See Williams, supra note 309, at 9-10.
317. See infra text accompanying note 334 (declaring California's bill of
rights was essentially removed by constitutional amendments, and, thus, the
state relys solely on the federal Bill of Rights).
318. See supra text accompanying note 310.
319. See supra text accompanying note 311.
320. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 186-88; Winters, supra note 9, at
131; see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
32L See Convention Committee Describes New Judicial System Adopted in
New Jersey, 31 JUDICATURE 138, 139-40 (1948).
322. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 187.
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and procedure in all courts; and limiting the functions of each
judge to one court.3"
Beyond restructuring the court system, the Judiciary
Committee's greatest achievement was establishing a strong
supreme court. Providing for a selection and tenure method
free from the political process,3 4 granting wide discretion for
supreme court review, and establishing the chief justice as
the head of the court system made the supreme court a for-
midable player in the state of New Jersey.3" In fact, the office
of chief justice was perhaps the most powerful office created
by the 1947 constitution."6
The Judicial Committee's comments in adopting these
pro-judiciary provisions demonstrate its commitment to a
powerful high court. In addressing the issue of which cases
should be heard by the high court, the committee chose to
grant expansive, rather than limited, jurisdiction."' "By
making the new Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction selec-
tive, that court is assured of an adequate opportunity to hear,
consider and decide every case which comes before it."" Fur-
ther, the Judicial Committee's comments on the method of
selection and tenure for supreme court justices also under-
lined their dedication to a strong high court. "By making
judges secure in their positions, the possibility of distractions
concerned with reappointment would be removed."329 The in-
tent of the New Jersey constitutional convention of 1947 was
clear: establish a broad range of individual rights for the su-
preme court to interpret, and permit the justices the security
to decide a variety of cases. This led the editor of the Journal
of the American Judicature Society to declare, before the 1947
constitution even went into effect, that upon adoption of the
New Jersey Constitution, "the people of New Jersey [would]
323. See Convention Committee Describes New Judicial System Adopted in
New Jersey, supra note 321, at 138-39.
324 See supra Part IV.A.
325. See Convention Committee Describes New Judicial System Adopted in
New Jersey, supra note 321, at 139-41.
326. See Edward A. Hartnett, Popular Sovereignty, Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, and the New Jersey Constitution of 1947: A Reply to Justice O'Hern and
Professor Williams, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 839, 842 (1997) (quoting Conver-
sations with Morris Schnitzer, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1391, 1407 (1995)).
327. See Convention Committee Describes New Judicial System Adopted in
New Jersey, supra note 321, at 140.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 141.
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exchange America's worst court system for America's best."33
Unlike the New Jersey Constitution, which establishes
an independent supreme court, the California Constitution
limits the ability of its supreme court to rule independently
and progressively. Specifically, California utilizes the initia-
tive and referendum system to overturn numerous liberal de-
cisions of the California Supreme Court."' The initiative and
referendum procedure permits the people to place issues on
the ballot for amending the state constitution.3 ' While
twenty-four states have this system in place, none use it with
the frequency of California."'
For example, the people in California essentially have
overturned numerous liberal decisions of the California
Supreme Court in the area of criminal procedure by sub-
mitting initiatives to the voters which have effectively re-
duced the power of the court. The voters of California
amended their state constitution to require the Supreme
Court to interpret virtually every constitutional right in-
tended to protect defendants in criminal cases exactly the
same as the parallel provision of the United States Consti-
tution. There is essentially no bill of rights in California.
There is only the Federal Bill of Rights.
3 34
In New Jersey, there is no referendum system to permit vot-
ers from reversing unpopular, progressive decisions.335 Thus,
while the initiative and referendum system subjects Califor-
nia Supreme Court decisions to easy reversal by popular vote,
the New Jersey Supreme Court remains more insulated from
the amendment process. 6
330. Winters, supra note 9, at 131.
331. See Wefing, supra note 20, at 716-17.
332. See id. at 716.
333. See id.
334. Id. at 716-17.
335. In New Jersey, amendments to the constitution require three-fifths vote
of each house of the legislature in one year, or a simple majority of the legisla-
ture in two successive years. Only after this process will a proposed amend-
ment appear on a ballot. See N.J. CONST. art. MX para. 1.
336. The voters confronted the New Jersey Supreme Court twice in 1992 by
passing amendments overturning two of the coures decisions. See generally
Wefing, supra note 20, at 718-20 (noting that if the New Jersey legislature be-
gins to use this amendment process more frequently to undercut the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court, it may jeopardize the court's independence).
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C. State Supreme Court Justices as Leaders and
Policymakers
While selection and tenure methods along with a suppor-
tive state constitution enable justices to rule progressively,
each individual justice must take his or her own step into ju-
dicial activism. Prior to the Bird controversy, the California
Supreme Court enjoyed years of strong leadership by progres-
sive chief justices. Similarly, the leader of the New Jersey ju-
dicial reformation, former New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, brought progressive ideals to the New Jersey
court. This section addresses the significance of the chief jus-
tice position and a 1971 study of the perceptions among state
supreme court justices regarding their role in the political
process,3 7 which further demonstrates the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's dedication to activism.
During the period from 1940 to 1977, prominent judicial
leaders and scholars served as Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court. Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright
embedded an activist disposition in the California court."8
Since the retirement of Chief Justice Wright, the court has
undergone significant change. 9 "Rose Bird rarely shares the
accolades heaped on the three chief justices who preceded her
[Gibson, Traynor, and Wright]."3 4' Further, after her ousting,
equally unheralded justices, Malcolm Lucas and Ronald
George, led the court down a more conservative path. 1 The
vision of an activist, progressive tribunal instilled in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court during the Gibson-Traynor-Wright era
is over.3 42 Filling the seat of chief justice with a leader the
caliber of Bird's predecessors is perhaps the first step in re-
turning the California court to its activist prominence.
Similar to Gibson, Traynor, and Wright in California, the
chief justice position led the progressive era in New Jersey.
"Through his support of judicial reform and his service as
337. See HENRY ROBERT GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE, at xi (1971).
338. See supra Part H.B.1.
339. See Culver, supra note 167, at 1463.
340. Barnett, supra note 168, at 86.
341. While Malcolm Lucas is often credited with stabilizing the turbulent
California Supreme Court, his reputation regarding judicial restraint and def-
erence--over judicial activism and policy-making--clearly distinguishes his
court from the progressive courts of his predecessors. See supra Part II.B.4.
342. See supra Part II.B.4.
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chief justice, Arthur Vanderbilt fundamentally reshaped-one
might even say created-the New Jersey Supreme Court."343
During the 1947 constitutional convention, the Judiciary
Committee freely borrowed ideas from Vanderbilt.14 Among
Vanderbilt's suggestions adopted by the Judicial Committee
were the establishment of a seven-member supreme court,
centralization of managerial authority in the hands of the
chief justice, and elimination of the division of law and eq-
uity.345 Further, as chief justice, Vanderbilt influenced the
supreme court to take an activist approach to their decisions.
Robert Wilentz, the chief justice who served after Vanderbilt,
placed the expectations of the New Jersey court after Van-
derbilt into perspective, "the experience of that reform [dur-
ing Vanderbilt's era] is so strong, and its meaning so clear,
that it still moves us substantially in New Jersey."346 The
Vanderbilt legacy remains as an example for other state su-
preme courts to model: one leader, dedicated to reform and
activism, can transform an entire court from obscurity to na-
tional prominence.
A 1971 study of various state supreme court justices il-
lustrates the activist impression Vanderbilt left on subse-
quent justices and reveals a unique disposition of the New
Jersey court. A survey of supreme court justices from New
Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana 47 asked
what role each justice perceived him- or herself as playing in
the political process of their respective states.348 Only in New
Jersey did a majority of justices perceive themselves as "law-
makers," rather than "law interpreters" or "pragmatists."349
The study summarized the New Jersey court's position by ob-
serving, "[tihe New Jersey judges believe courts make policy
and they tend to innovate and even make proposals to the
state legislature... the New Jersey Supreme Court appears
to contribute frequently to policy change in the state."35 Al-
though the scope of the study was limited to one set of New
343. TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 186.
344. See id. at 190.
345. See id. at 191.
346. Id. at 195.
347. See GLICI, supra note 337, at 41 tbls.2-3.
348. See id. at 24-26.
349. Id. at 41 tbls.2-3.
350. Id. at 47.
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Jersey justices during a particular period,35' its results never-
theless deserve recognition. The study shows that the activist
and reformist nature of Arthur Vanderbilt 52 manifested itself
in the perceptions of the justices who followed him.
V. PROPOSAL
"Taken altogether, the picture that emerges is of a court
that has eagerly embraced opportunities to promulgate policy
for the state and doctrine for the nation, confident in its own
abilities and of the legitimacy of the activist posture it has
adopted."53 This description of the New Jersey Supreme
Court also accurately reflects the pre-Bird California court. "
Unfortunately, politics and the appointment of more conser-
vative justices took the California court in a more moderate,
mainstream direction.355 To return the California Supreme
Court to its activist prominence will require a combination of
constitutional redrafting and a rededication of the justices to
independent decision making. Using the New Jersey Su-
preme Court as a model is perhaps the first step in reshaping
the high court of the Golden State.
While this comment does not purport to propose an exact
formula for creating a progressive court, certain attributes of
the New Jersey system lay the groundwork for constructing a
progressive state supreme court. First, to permit state high
courts to rule independently of political pressures, judicial
selection and tenure methods should be free from popular
elections. 56 Second, since state supreme courts alone are re-
sponsible for interpreting state constitutions, states should
develop constitutions containing expansive individual rights
and a judicial system structured to provide the high court
room to interpret such rights. Further, the California experi-
ence demonstrates that states should not implement the ini-
tiative and referendum system for amending state constitu-
tions."5 7 Third, the selection process should target activist
justices-such as Chief Justice Vanderbilt in New Jersey and
351. See id. at 15-19.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 343-46.
353. TARR & PORTER, supra note 1, at 184-85.
354. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
355. See supra Part II.B.4.
356. See supra Part IV.A.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 331-34.
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Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright in Californi&5 -
who are willing to take an active part in the political process
of the state. By implementing the New Jersey model, high
courts of other states, including California, can take major
steps towards earning similar recognition.359
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment highlights the attributes of the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court that have earned it a national reputation
for independence and activism.36 Further, this comment re-
veals, via the California experience, how politics can overhaul
a tribunal literally overnight."' This comment suggests that
the Garden State, rather than the Golden State, model is
most desirable."' New Jersey's history of activism deserves
praise and should serve as a guide to those states seeking to
change their supreme court from an inactive-perhaps irrele-
vant-judicial body, into an activist, progressive court.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 338-46.
359. The results reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court in controversial
cases, see supra Part ]I.A.2, should not necessarily be adopted by other jurisdic-
tions. Rather, this comment advocates modeling the New Jersey court because
it has proven, over time, to rule independently, often making unpopular deci-
sions. Such conviction should be the aim of every judicial body in the country.
360. See supra Parts IV, II.A.
36L See supra Part II.B.
362. See supra Part V.
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